【观点】德鲁克谈企业突围：使用“创业柔道战略”，攻其软肋

导言

创业柔道旨在先攻占一个“滩头堡”，也就是领先企业忽略或轻视的环节。

现有企业有五种相当常见的坏习惯，使得新进入者可以采用创业柔道战略对付这些老牌企业，并从它们手中夺取行业领导地位。

1.第一个坏习惯是美国俚语所说的“非我发明的”。这种傲慢会使企业或者产业认为，如果一个新事物不是自己发明的，就没有价值。这样，新发明就会遭到轻视。美国电子制造商就是如此对待晶体管的。

2.第二个坏习惯是从市场撇脂，即只关注高利润领域。正是由于施乐公司采取了这种做法，复印机才成为日本模仿者的目标。施乐公司瞄准大客户——批量设备或者昂贵的高性能设备的购买者。它虽然没有拒绝其他客户，但不主动寻找它们。特别是，它认为给那些客户提供服务是不合适的。最后，小客户对施乐公司的服务（或者是根本没有服务）不甚满意，进而转向竞争对手。

“撇脂”的做法违背了管理和经济的基本原则，最终总是会受到失去市场的惩罚。的确，施乐公司的成功是巨大的，也实至名归，但企业不会因为过去的成就而获得回报。“撇脂”就是试图从过去的成就中获利。这个习惯一旦形成，企业这样持续下去，将很容易遭受创业柔道战略的攻击。

3. 第三个坏习惯更为糟糕，就是迷信“品质”。产品或服务的“品质”不是供应商投入的东西，而是客户所能利用并愿意为之买单的东西。很多制造商认为，制造的难度大和成本高就是“品质”。其实不然。那是无能。客户只会为那些能够为自己所用并带来价值的东西买单。就“品质”来说，除此之外，别无其他。

20世纪50年代，美国电子制造商深信，具有很棒的真空管的收音机才是有“品质”的产品。这是因为，经过30年的努力，它们才制造出更复杂、更庞大、更昂贵的收音机。整个过程需要大量的技术，赋予了真空管收音机更高的“品质”。相比之下，晶体管收音机如此简单，仅仅靠不熟练的流水线工人就能生产出来。但是，从消费者的角度来看，晶体管收音机的“品质”更高。它足够轻便，可以随身携带去海滩或去野餐。它也很少出故障，不需要更换晶体管。它的价格要低得多。从接收范围和接收效果来看，它很快就超越了拥有16根真空管的超外差式收音机。更何况总是在需要使用收音机的时候，那些真空管会烧坏一两根。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

4.第四个坏习惯与“撇脂”和“品质”紧密相关，就是对“高价”的错觉。“高价”容易创造竞争对手。

自法国萨伊和英国大卫·李嘉图所处的19世纪初期开始，200多年来，经济学家普遍认为，除了垄断，获取高额利润的唯一方式就是降低成本。通过抬高价格来获取高额利润，往往会弄巧成拙。这为竞争者撑起了“保护伞”。在位的领先企业看似获得了高额利润，实际上是在补贴新进入者。几年后，这些新进入者就会掀翻领导者，自己取而代之。“高价”并不是享受胜利的方式，也不是提高股价或市盈率的方式，它会引致攻击行为，遭受威胁。

尽管“高价”会为竞争对手采取创业柔道提供可乘之机，但为获取高额利润而迷恋“高价”依然是普遍行为。

5.最后一个坏习惯是力求最大化而非最优化。这个坏习惯常见于现有企业，它会导致企业失败，施乐公司就是一个很好的例子。随着市场的发展，现有企业往往会试图用同样的产品或服务来满足每个客户的需求。

举个例子，用于测试化学反应的新型分析仪器，起初，它的市场有限，假定为产业实验室。随后，大学实验室、研究机构和医院都开始采购这种仪器，但它们的需求有些许不同。于是，为满足不同客户的需求，制造商数次增加产品的功能，直到原本简单的仪器变得异常复杂。制造商将仪器的功能最大化，最后却无法满足任何人的需求。为了尽力满足每个人的需求，结果却适得其反。这种仪器变得非常昂贵，而且难以操作和维护。制造商却以此为傲，用整页的广告列出该仪器的64种功能。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

毫无疑问，这家制造商将成为创业柔道战略的牺牲品。它自认为的优势，将会阻碍其发展。新进入者将推出针对特定市场（如医院）的仪器。它并不包含医院所不需要的功能，但具备医院所需的全部功能。而且，相比于多功能仪器，它的性能更为完善。随后，这个新进入者将陆续推出针对研究实验室、政府实验室、产业实验室的专用仪器。很快，依靠这些为客户量身定制的仪器，新进入者就会占领市场。它所采用的理念是最优化，而非最大化。

同样，当日本人进军复印机市场与施乐公司竞争时，他们也是针对特定客户群体设计机器，如办公室复印机特别适用于牙医、医生和校长的小型办公室。他们并不推崇产品要具备施乐公司引以为傲的功能（如复印速度快、清晰度高等）。他们为小型办公室提供它们迫切需要的产品，即低价的简单复印机。一旦他们在这个市场站稳脚跟，接着就进入其他市场，即针对每个特定细分市场专门设计产品。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

索尼公司也采取了同样的策略，首先进军低端收音机市场，推出价格低廉、接收范围有限的便携式收音机。一旦在这个市场站稳脚跟，它就开始转向其他细分市场。

创业柔道旨在先攻占一个“滩头堡”，也就是领先企业忽略或轻视的环节。比如，花旗银行建立家庭银行时，联邦德国银行置之不理。一旦占领了“滩头堡”，也就是说，一旦新进入者赢得了足够的市场并获得可观的收益，它们将会拓展到其他“沙滩”，最终占领整个“岛屿”。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

上述每一个案例中，新进入者都采用了同样的战略。它们针对特定的细分市场设计产品或服务，使之最优化。现有的领先企业很少会应战，甚至很少设法改变自己的行为，直到新进入者取得领导地位和主导市场。

对于下面三种情况，采用创业柔道尤为有效。

第一种情况比较常见，领先企业对意外事件置之不理，无论是意外成功，还是意外失败（要么忽视，要么拒之门外）。索尼公司就是在这种情况下抓住了机会。

第二种情况就是施乐公司的那种情况。一项新技术出现，并迅速发展。但是，新技术（或新服务）的创新者，犹如传统的“垄断者”——利用自身的领导地位从市场“撇脂”，卖“高价”。它们或许是不知道，或许是拒绝接受这一既定事实：只有“仁慈的垄断者”（熊彼特提出的说法）才能保持领导地位，更不必说垄断地位了。

在竞争者有能力降低价格之前，“仁慈的垄断者”会主动降价。在竞争对手推出新产品之前，它就会主动淘汰自己的产品，并推出新产品。有很多例子可以证明这一论点的有效性。多年以来，杜邦公司一直如此行事。贝尔电话公司在20世纪70年代由于通胀而衰败之前，也是采取这种策略。如果领导者通过利用领导地位提高价格而非低成本来获取利润，那么任何创业柔道战略实施者都能将其击败。

同样，快速发展的新市场或新技术的领导者，如果力求最大化而非最优化，也会受到创业柔道战略实施者的攻击。

第三种情况是市场或产业结构快速变化，此时创业柔道尤其有效，这就是家庭银行抓住的那种机会。20世纪五六十年代，联邦德国日渐繁荣，除了传统储蓄或抵押贷款之外，普通群众对其他金融业务也有需求。但是，联邦德国银行却固守先前的市场。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

创业柔道总是以市场为中心，以市场为导向。它可能以技术为起点，如盛田昭夫从二战后刚刚复苏的日本前往美国，以获取晶体管的许可权。他瞄准的是便携式收音机市场。这是现有技术最不能满足的细分市场，根本原因是真空管笨重且脆弱。他使用晶体管设计出适合这个市场的收音机。这是一个年轻人组成的市场，他们收入较低，对收音机的接收范围和音质要求不高。换句话说，这是一个老技术根本无法充分满足的市场。

同样，美国的长途电话业务折扣公司发现一个机会，从贝尔系统批量购买长途电话业务，然后以零售价转卖给客户。它们先是为数量不太多的某类企业提供服务。这些企业的规模没有大到足以建设自己的长途电话系统，但又大到需要支付高昂的长途电话费用。等获得足够的市场份额后，它们开始转向很大的客户或者小客户。

要采用创业柔道，首先要对所在产业进行分析，对生产商和供应商的习惯，尤其是坏习惯，以及它们的策略进行分析。然后，再关注整个市场，设法找到一个突破口，使替代战略能取得最大成功，使遭遇的阻力最小。

创业柔道需要一定程度上的真正创新。一般来说，仅仅以较低价格提供同样的产品或服务，是远远不够的。它必须与现有事物有所区别。

罗尔姆公司为了与AT&T竞争而推出的用户级交换机（用于企业和办公室的电话总机），增加了一些围绕小型计算机设计的功能。这些创新并非高科技，更算不上新发明。事实上，AT&T也设计了类似的功能，只是没有将其推向市场。同样，当花旗银行在联邦德国创建家庭银行时，提供了一些创新服务，如旅行支票或税务咨询，而联邦德国银行通常不会为小储户提供这些服务。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

换言之，对新进入者而言，仅仅以较低的价格或更好的服务提供与现有企业相同的产品或服务，是远远不够的。它们必须具有独特之处。

与“孤注一掷”和创造性模仿一样，新创企业实施创业柔道旨在获取领导地位，最终主导市场。但是，它并不与领先企业展开竞争，至少不会进军使领先企业感到竞争威胁的领域。创业柔道就是“攻其软肋”。

翻译：

Drucker talks about enterprise breakthrough: Using “entrepreneurial judo strategy” to attack its soft spots

Introduction

Entrepreneurial judo aims to first capture a “beachhead”, that is, the link that leading companies ignore or despise. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

There are five fairly common bad habits of incumbents that allow new entrants to adopt entrepreneurial judo strategies to take on these incumbents and wrest industry leadership from them.

1. The first bad habit is American slang for “I didn’t invent it.” This arrogance can lead companies or industries to believe that if a new thing is not invented by themselves, it has no value. In this way, new inventions are looked down upon. That’s what American electronics manufacturers did with transistors.

2. The second bad habit is skimming off the market, focusing only on high-margin areas. It was because of this approach adopted by Xerox that copiers became targets for Japanese imitators. Xerox targeted large customers – buyers of bulk equipment or expensive high-performance equipment. While it does not turn away other customers, it does not actively seek them out. In particular, it considers it inappropriate to serve those customers. Eventually, smaller customers became dissatisfied with Xerox’s service (or no service at all) and switched to a competitor.

The practice of skimming violates basic principles of management and economics and is always punished in the end by the loss of the market. Yes, Xerox’s success was enormous and well deserved, but companies are not rewarded for past achievements. Skimming is trying to profit from past achievements. Once this habit is formed, the enterprise will be vulnerable to the attack of entrepreneurial judo strategy if it continues like this. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

3. The third bad habit, even worse, is the belief in “character.” The “quality” of a product or service is not something the supplier puts in, but something the customer can take advantage of and is willing to pay for. Many manufacturers believe that the difficulty and high cost of manufacturing is “quality”. Not so much. That’s incompetence. Customers will only pay for things that work for them and bring value. As far as “quality” is concerned, there is nothing else.

In the 1950s, American electronics manufacturers were convinced that a radio with a great vacuum tube was a “quality” product. That’s because it took them 30 years to build more complex, larger, and more expensive radios. The whole process requires a lot of technology, giving the vacuum tube radio a higher “quality”. Transistor radios, by contrast, are so simple that they can be produced only by unskilled assembly line workers. However, from the consumer’s point of view, the “quality” of the transistor radio is higher. It’s light enough to take with you to the beach or on a picnic. It also rarely breaks down and does not need to replace transistors. Its price is much lower. In terms of receiving range and receiving effect, it soon surpassed the superheterodyne radio with 16 vacuum tubes. What’s more, when you always need to use the radio, those vacuum tubes will burn out one or two.

4. The fourth bad habit, closely related to skimming and quality, is the illusion of high prices. “High prices” tend to create competitors. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

For more than 200 years, starting with Say in France and David Ricardo in England in the early 19th century, economists have generally believed that the only way to make high profits other than monopolies is to reduce costs. Raising prices to make high profits is often self-defeating. This provides a “protective umbrella” for competitors. What appears to be high profits for incumbent leaders are actually subsidizing new entrants. In a few years, these new entrants will topple the leader and take their place. “High price” is not a way to enjoy victory, nor is it a way to raise stock prices or price-to-earnings ratios; it invites aggression and is threatened.

Although “high prices” can provide an opportunity for competitors to adopt entrepreneurial judo, infatuation with “high prices” for high profits is still common.

5. The final bad habit is maximizing rather than optimizing. This bad habit is common in established businesses, and it can lead to business failure, Xerox is a good example. As the market evolves, incumbents tend to try to meet each customer’s needs with the same product or service.

Take, for example, the new analytical instruments used to test chemical reactions, which initially had a limited market and were assumed to be industrial laboratories. Subsequently, university LABS, research institutes and hospitals began to purchase the instruments, but their needs were slightly different. As a result, in order to meet the needs of different customers, manufacturers increased the functionality of the product several times, until the originally simple instrument became extremely complex. The manufacturer maximizes the functionality of the instrument and ends up not satisfying anyone’s needs. Trying to satisfy everyone’s needs has the opposite effect. Such instruments became very expensive and difficult to operate and maintain. The manufacturer is proud of it, with a full-page advertisement listing 64 features of the device. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

No doubt the manufacturer will fall victim to the entrepreneurial judo strategy. Its perceived advantages will hinder its development. New entrants will launch instruments for specific markets, such as hospitals. It does not contain the functions that a hospital does not need, but it has all the functions that a hospital needs. Moreover, compared with multifunctional instruments, its performance is more complete. Subsequently, this new entrant will launch specialized instruments for research laboratories, government laboratories, and industrial laboratories. Soon, with these tailor-made instruments, new entrants will dominate the market. The idea behind it is optimization, not maximization.

Similarly, when the Japanese entered the copier market to compete with Xerox, they also designed machines for specific customer groups, such as office copiers that were especially suitable for the small offices of dentists, doctors, and principals. They didn’t want products to have the features Xerox prided itself on (like fast copy speed and high resolution). They provide small offices with a product they desperately need: a simple photocopier at a low price. Once they are established in this market, they move on to other markets, designing products specifically for each specific market segment.

SONY followed the same strategy, moving first into the low-end radio market with inexpensive portable radios with limited range. Once established in this market, it began to move into other segments.

Entrepreneurial judo aims to first capture a “beachhead”, that is, the link that leading companies ignore or despise. When Citibank set up a home bank, for example, the Bundesbank did nothing. Once the “beachhead” is captured, that is, once the new entrants have won enough of the market and made a decent profit, they will expand to other “beaches” and eventually occupy the entire “island.”

In each of these cases, the new entrants adopted the same strategy. They design products or services to be optimized for specific market segments. Incumbent leaders rarely respond, or even try to change their behavior, until new entrants achieve leadership and market dominance.

For the following three situations, adopting entrepreneurial judo is particularly effective.

In the first scenario, which is more common, leading companies ignore unexpected events, whether unexpected successes or unexpected failures (either ignoring them or shutting them out). That’s where SONY jumped at the chance.

The second scenario is the Xerox scenario. A new technology appears and develops rapidly. But innovators of new technologies (or services) are like traditional “monopolists” – using their leadership to skim off the market and sell at “high prices.” Either they do not know, or they refuse to accept, the established fact that only a “benevolent monopolist” (as Schumpeter put it) can maintain leadership, let alone monopoly. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

The “benevolent monopolist” will voluntarily lower prices before competitors are able to do so. It will actively eliminate its own products and launch new ones before competitors launch new ones. There are many examples to show the validity of this argument. Dupont has been doing this for years. The Bell Telephone Company followed this strategy before its inflation-driven downfall in the 1970s. If leaders profit by using their leadership position to raise prices rather than lower costs, any entrepreneurial judo strategy implementor can beat them. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

Similarly, leaders of rapidly developing new markets or technologies who seek to maximize rather than optimize can be attacked by the implementers of entrepreneurial judo strategies.

The third situation is when the market or industrial structure changes rapidly, when entrepreneurial judo is particularly effective, and this is the kind of opportunity that home banks seize. In the 1950s and 1960s, as the Federal Republic of Germany prospered, ordinary people had a demand for financial services other than traditional savings or mortgages. But the Bundesbank is sticking to the old market.

Entrepreneurial judo is always market-centered and market-oriented. It may start with technology, as when Akio Morita travelled to the United States from a recovering Japan after World War II to license transistors. His target was the portable radio market. This is the most unsatisfactory segment of the existing technology, the fundamental reason is that the vacuum tube is bulky and fragile. He used transistors to design radios suitable for this market. This is a market composed of young people, who have lower incomes and do not have high requirements for the range and sound quality of the radio. In other words, this is a market that is simply not adequately served by older technologies.

Similarly, a discount company in the United States saw an opportunity to buy long-distance services in bulk from Bell Systems and resell them to customers at retail prices. They started by serving a small number of businesses of a certain kind. These companies are not big enough to build their own long-distance phone systems, but they are big enough to pay high long-distance phone charges. After gaining enough market share, they start to move on to large or small customers.

To adopt entrepreneurial judo, one must first analyze the industry, the habits of producers and suppliers, especially the bad habits, and their strategies. Then, look at the entire market and try to find a breakthrough that will allow the alternative strategy to have the greatest success and the least resistance. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

Entrepreneurial judo requires a certain level of real innovation. In general, simply offering the same product or service at a lower price is not enough. It has to be different from what’s already there.

Rolm’s user-level switches (switchboards for businesses and offices), designed to compete with AT&T, added some features designed around minicomputers. These innovations are not high-tech, let alone new. In fact, AT&T designed a similar feature, it just didn’t bring it to market. Similarly, when Citibank created a home bank in the Federal Republic of Germany, it offered some innovative services, such as traveler’s checks or tax advice, that the Federal Bank would not normally offer to small depositors.

In other words, it is not enough for new entrants to simply offer the same products or services as incumbents at a lower price or better service. They have to be unique.

Like “go for it” and creative imitation, startups implement entrepreneurial judo to gain leadership and eventually dominate the market. But it does not compete with the leaders, at least not in areas where they feel threatened by competition. To start a judo business is to “attack its soft spot”.

本文由CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）转载而成，来源于《创新与企业家精神；编辑/翻译：CXO UNIONCXO联盟小U。

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