【观点】黄益平、胡佳胤 ：数字平台定价应兼顾市场机制与社会影响

自亚当斯密以来，自由市场如何配置资源、决定价格，一直是一个充满争议的话题，争论的焦点是如何平衡“看不见的手”和“看得见的手”之间的关系。而平台经济的发展则为这个古老的争论增添了新的视角。网络效应、规模经济、范围经济等新特征很容易让平台企业拥有较大的市场份额和较强的市场势力。按逻辑推演，平台经济中的定价可能存在不合理的成分，这也是许多消费者常常会担心的问题。那么，如何判断平台经济定价中“看不见的手”的合理性？“看得见的手”又应该在什么条件下发挥作用、如何作用？只有厘清这些问题，才谈得上完善平台定价机制。而当前中国平台经济政策从专项整治走向常态化监管，这项任务变得尤为重要与迫切。

如果把市场机制看成追求“程序正义”的过程，即定价过程中必须有充分的市场竞争力量参与，那么监管政策更像是追求“结果正义”的手段，即平台最后形成的价格要落在一个多方参与者都能够接受的区间。好的平台定价机制应该依靠市场机制与监管政策共同发挥作用，兼顾“程序正义”与“结果正义”。但“看不见的手”和“看得见的手”最好能相辅相成，监管政策最好能够促进市场机制的良性运作，重点应该放在设置平台经济定价的一些基本规则，同时提升市场的竞争性，而不是简单粗暴地限制价格水平，这样就容易影响平台经济的市场机制，有可能会“好心办坏事”。比如有研究发现，美国对外卖平台佣金上限的定价监管反倒使得中小餐厅的订单和收入都减少了，社会的整体福利也下降了。

一、“结果正义”与数字平台的附加价值

平台定价合理性的衡量维度可以有很多种。一个切入点是从结果出发，对比平台的收费和平台为商家或消费者提供的潜在价值。如果平台为商家提供了广阔的消费者群体（比如帮助触达客户、实时匹配供需双方），或者提供了数字平台的便利（比如自动化、数字化、降低成本、提高效率、大数据分析），那么定价相对于平台提供的价值来说是合理的。这与社会福利的分析是密切相关的。已经有一系列文献都指出了数字平台带来的价值。

对商户来说，数字平台作为数字技术驱动的双边或多边市场，通过数字化和自动化打破交易的时空限制，有助于降低创业门槛、获客成本和交易费用，提高交易效率和盈利能力。许多研究都表明，数字平台在创造就业、鼓励就业和促进中小企业发展等方面发挥着重要的价值，在带动相关就业、提高劳动者收入等方面发挥着不可或缺的作用。数字平台进一步借助数字基础设施（例如互联网、4G/5G网络、智能手机等）的普及打通全国乃至全球的市场，并通过整合上下游产业链和供应链优化资源配置，有助于商家迅速扩大市场规模，促进商贸繁荣。

对消费者来说，数字平台本身引领了消费形态的变化。数字平台赋予了人们线上消费的选项，让居民的消费跨越了天气、地理距离和出行障碍的限制，平滑了消费曲线，也激发了更多消费需求。数字平台有助于降低市场交易的不确定性和风险，增强消费者的信心。数字平台提供了公开、透明、便于查询、可预期的定价，引导全国各地的价格朝这一基准靠拢，有助于减少线下的“宰客”现象，为消费者提供更低的价格，更多样化的选择，和更省心的服务。总的来说，平台提供的附加价值和服务让消费者在购物体验上拥有更多的便利、更多样的选择和更大的灵活性。

数字平台提供的第三方担保和交易工具还从金融角度保障了支付的安全性和交易的可靠性。平台承担了包括退货在内的一系列规则制定和处理纠纷的职能，多方面提振了消费者对平台商家的信任，从而转化出更多的数字平台生态系统中的消费。通过数字平台而实现的线上消费还有着稳定经济和包容普惠的作用，在疫情防控等线下活动受限时期发挥着平稳运转、对冲下行风险的重要功能，也持续为老弱病残孕等因身体因素不便外出的人群带来便利，在民生保障中发挥积极的市场化力量。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

从定价角度来看，双（多）边市场具备的市场势力与网络效应是相互促进的，这一特性打破了“市场势力会抬高价格、降低消费者福利”的传统论点。例如，不少实证研究发现，报纸出版社或广播电台公司的并购提升了它们的市场势力，提高了广告商打广告的价格。然而，由于消费者不喜欢广告，这种结果反而提高了消费者福利。又比如，餐饮外卖行业平台通过向商家收费来给消费者补贴运费，用以维持小额外卖的配送服务，这有助于保持足量的外卖消费者数量，使商户获得网络效应带来的额外收益。如果压低平台收费而导致对消费者补贴下降，则有可能使得部分消费者退出外卖市场。这又会进一步降低商家在平台上获得的收入和利润，并提高其他订单面临的配送成本（部分固定成本无法在更大基数上摊薄）。部分商家的退出又会导致平台菜品多样性的减少，降低消费者福利。在双边市场上，消费者和商家的退出会彼此强化，最终导致社会福利的损失。

双（多）边市场的特性还导致平台定价存在着“跷跷板效应”，也就是说，某些提高一方价格的冲击通常会降低另一方的价格。这一效应在不同行业领域（例如媒体、电信和支付等行业）都有不同程度的体现。

二、“程序正义”与数字平台的可竞争性

评估平台定价合理性的另一个切入点是从价格形成的过程出发，看平台经济的竞争程度：如果市场竞争比较充分，那么这样形成的定价相对是合理的。如果平台有垄断定价的能力，那么这一定价通常被认为是不利于增进社会福利的。而平台是否具有垄断地位，很可能并不仅仅取决于当前平台所在的细分领域大企业的数量（一家或两三家），而要考虑整体的竞争压力（比如是否有跨界竞争者和颠覆式创新者的存在）。哪怕一个市场上暂时呈现出垄断或寡头的市场结构，但由于潜在竞争对手的存在，其定价也有可能是合理的。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

美国经济学家鲍莫尔及其合作者提出了“可竞争性”理论。可竞争市场的一个重要特点在于，市场的进入和退出是完全自由和零成本的。来自于潜在的（很可能也是无法提前预判的）竞争对手的挑战压力，会约束市场中既有企业的定价行为。因此哪怕这个市场上暂时呈现出垄断或寡头的市场结构，其定价也仍然遵循社会最优的边际成本定价规则。

在数字时代的今天，这一条件变得不是那么遥远。在轻资产模式盛行的互联网时代，用户数据是最主要的资源，而与数据收集、存储、调用、分析和应用相关的投入在各行各业都可以普适性地转化使用。比如，以用户搜索为切入点的平台公司，可以便捷地进入电商外卖、本地生活等其它消费市场。而智能手机的普及、电信基础设施的广泛覆盖，则让互联网行业的进入退出门槛变得相当之低。尤其是在互联网巨头之间，进入彼此的市场领地变得非常容易。跨界竞争的普遍性将会让头部平台企业面临较大的竞争压力，从而一定程度上让市场均衡向社会福利最优的结果靠近。

可竞争市场这一概念与经济学中经典的完全竞争市场分析框架类似，虽然在现实生活中非常罕见，但作为分析的基准点仍然有着不可忽视的参照价值。“可竞争性”对理解市场结构和反垄断政策有重要意义。监管部门和反垄断政策应该重点关注降低市场的进入和退出成本，而非当前的企业数量。公共部门来负责基础设施的投资，或者保障行业基础设施对所有企业开放，是维系市场可竞争性的重要条件。

三、数字平台定价应兼顾市场机制与社会影响

数字时代的平台定价问题有其特殊的复杂性，有以下几点体现：

第一，数字平台不只有双边市场，还有多边市场，常常有三方甚至更多方市场参与主体在平台中互动。例如，电商和外卖平台主要对接的是消费者和商家，但随着物流配送重要性的显现，快递员和外卖员也成为平台中的关键参与者。视频短视频等流媒体平台主要对接的是用户（内容消费者）和博主等内容创造者，但广告商则是平台的重要盈利来源。这对搜索引擎平台来说也如此。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

因此，平台的定价问题变得更加复杂，除了供求关系平衡和覆盖成本之外，还涉及到一定的利益协调问题，甚至承担了部分社会治理的功能。这时候尤其需要厘清平台定价需要实现的目标函数，以及是否还有其他非价格手段可以用来实现特定目标。政府与市场各自扮演的角色也需要厘清。

第二，尽管数字平台普遍具备一定的网络效应、规模经济和范围经济特征，但在行业层面有很强的异质性，平台之间的差别很大。例如，外卖平台与电商平台的不同之处在于部分环节是线下完成的，因此其规模经济、网络外部性和多边市场的特性介于纯线上平台（如电商）和纯线下平台（如百货公司）之间。对于外卖、即时消费等O2O平台来说，一方面需求端网络效应相对更加本地化，广告触达的受众范围相对电商更窄且时效性更强，另一方面供给端依赖线下配送，无法实现纯线上经济所能达到的规模效应。网约车平台更是如此，实时动态特征明显，也更加受制于线下人力物力的供给。

因此，平台的定价模式往往与其业务特征紧密挂钩，相应的监管政策也应依据平台特征来适当调整。不同业务类型的平台，定价模式也会不一样，需要深入研判，不可一概而论。

第三，数字经济的发展日新月异，新平台不断涌现，老平台的优势可能消退，应当用动态的眼光来看平台经济的竞争程度。轻资产模式盛行的互联网时代，用户数据是最主要的资源，而与数据收集、存储、调用、分析和应用相关的投入在各行各业都可以普适性地转化使用。比如，以用户搜索为切入点的平台公司，可以便捷地进入电商外卖、本地生活等其它消费市场。而智能手机的普及、电信基础设施的广泛覆盖，则让互联网行业的进入退出门槛变得相当之低。尤其是在互联网巨头之间，进入彼此的市场领地变得非常容易。

跨界竞争的普遍性将会让头部平台企业面临较大的竞争压力，从而一定程度上让市场均衡向社会福利最优的结果靠近。定价是在竞争中形成的。如果市场竞争比较充分，那么平台就无法超过市场力量来定价，这样形成的价格就相对是合理的。 CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

综上，平台定价和监管政策应该平衡好市场机制和社会影响之间的关系，兼顾“结果正义”与“程序正义”。监管者应当密切关注平台竞争格局的动态变化特征，在加强监管时注重发挥市场自身的力量。一方面，对于明显不合理的平台定价可以采取适当的限制措施，但重点应放在完善定价机制与规则，鼓励平台为消费者和中小商家提供更多基于数字技术的附加价值，而非坐收垄断势力带来的租金；另一方面更需要给市场竞争创造更包容的政策环境，比如通过降低进入门槛增强行业的“可竞争性”，减少行政性的对平台微观经营的直接干预，将政策性力量更多地集中在打击不正当竞争行为上，让市场性力量发挥价格发现和资源配置的基础性作用，为平台经济规范健康发展塑造良好的政策环境。“有为政府”和“有效市场”两者结合，各司其职，可以更有效地保护消费者合法权益，激活平台和中小商户创新活力，促进中国数字经济持续健康发展。

翻译：

Huang Yiping, Hu Jiaying: Digital platform pricing should take into account the market mechanism and social impact

Since Adam Smith, how a free market allocates resources and determines prices has been a contentious topic, with the debate over how to balance the “invisible hand” with the “visible hand.” The development of the platform economy has added a new perspective to this old debate. New features such as network effects, economies of scale, and economies of scope make it easy for platform companies to have a larger market share and strong market power. Logically, pricing in the platform economy may be unreasonable, which is also a problem that many consumers often worry about. So, how to judge the rationality of the “invisible hand” in platform economic pricing? Under what conditions should the “visible hand” function and how? Only by clarifying these issues can we talk about improving the platform pricing mechanism. At present, China’s platform economic policy has shifted from special rectification to normal supervision, and this task has become particularly important and urgent. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

If the market mechanism is regarded as the process of pursuing “procedural justice”, that is, there must be sufficient market competition forces involved in the pricing process, then the regulatory policy is more like the means of pursuing “outcome justice”, that is, the final price formed by the platform should fall in a range acceptable to multiple participants. A good platform pricing mechanism should rely on market mechanism and regulatory policy to play a role together, taking into account “procedural justice” and “outcome justice”. However, the “invisible hand” and the “visible hand” had better complement each other, and the regulatory policy had better promote the benign operation of the market mechanism. The focus should be on setting some basic rules for the pricing of the platform economy and enhancing the competitiveness of the market at the same time, rather than simply and brutally limiting the price level, which would easily affect the market mechanism of the platform economy. There may be “good intentions and bad intentions”. For example, studies have found that the pricing regulation of the commission cap on the outbound platform in the United States has actually reduced the orders and revenue of small and medium-sized restaurants, and the overall welfare of society has also declined.

First, “outcome justice” and the added value of digital platforms

There are many dimensions to measure the reasonableness of platform pricing. One starting point is to start with the results and compare the fees of the platform to the potential value that the platform provides to the merchant or consumer. If the platform provides merchants with a broad consumer base (such as helping to reach customers, matching supply and demand in real time), or provides the convenience of a digital platform (such as automation, digitization, cost reduction, efficiency improvement, big data analytics), then the pricing is reasonable relative to the value that the platform provides. This is closely related to the analysis of social welfare. There is already a body of literature pointing to the value that digital platforms bring. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

For merchants, digital platforms, as bilateral or multilateral markets driven by digital technology, break the time and space restrictions of transactions through digitalization and automation, helping to reduce the threshold of entrepreneurship, customer acquisition costs and transaction costs, and improve transaction efficiency and profitability. Many studies have shown that digital platforms play an important role in creating jobs, encouraging employment and promoting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and play an indispensable role in driving related employment and improving workers’ incomes. Digital platforms further open up the national and even global markets with the help of digital infrastructure (such as the Internet, 4G/5G network, smart phones, etc.), and optimize resource allocation by integrating the upstream and downstream industrial chains and supply chains, which helps merchants rapidly expand the market scale and promote trade prosperity.

For consumers, the digital platform itself has led to changes in consumption patterns. Digital platforms give people the option to consume online, allowing residents to spend beyond the constraints of weather, geographical distance and travel barriers, smoothing the consumption curve and stimulating more consumer demand. Digital platforms help reduce uncertainty and risk in market transactions and enhance consumer confidence. Digital platforms provide open, transparent, easily searchable, and predictable pricing, guiding prices across the country toward this benchmark, helping to reduce offline “rip-offs” and providing consumers with lower prices, more diverse choices, and more hassle-free services. Overall, the added value and services provided by the platform allow consumers to have more convenience, more choices and greater flexibility in their shopping experience. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

Third-party guarantees and trading instruments provided by digital platforms also guarantee the security of payments and the reliability of transactions from a financial perspective. The platform undertakes a series of rule-making and dispute handling functions, including returns, which has boosted consumers’ trust in platform merchants in many ways, thus translating into more consumption in the digital platform ecosystem. Online consumption achieved through digital platforms also plays a role in stabilizing the economy and providing inclusive benefits. It plays an important function of smooth operation and hedging downside risks during the period of limited offline activities such as epidemic prevention and control. It also continues to bring convenience to the elderly, the infirm, the disabled, the pregnant and other people who are unable to go out due to physical factors, and plays a positive market force in ensuring people’s livelihood.

From the point of view of pricing, the market power and network effects of dual (multi-sided) markets are mutually reinforcing, which breaks the traditional argument that market power will raise prices and reduce consumer welfare. For example, many empirical studies have found that mergers and acquisitions of newspaper publishers or radio companies increase their market power and raise the price advertisers pay for advertising. However, since consumers do not like advertising, the result is to improve consumer welfare. For another example, the food and beverage delivery industry platform subsidizes freight costs to consumers by charging merchants to maintain the delivery service of small takeout, which helps maintain a sufficient number of takeout consumers and enables merchants to obtain additional benefits brought by network effects. If the lower platform charges lead to a decline in consumer subsidies, it is possible to make some consumers withdraw from the take-out market. This, in turn, further reduces the revenue and profits merchants earn on the platform, and increases the delivery costs faced by other orders (some fixed costs cannot be diluted on a larger base). The withdrawal of some merchants will lead to the reduction of the diversity of dishes on the platform and reduce the welfare of consumers. In a two-sided market, the withdrawal of consumers and merchants will reinforce each other, ultimately leading to a loss of social welfare. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

The nature of dual (multi-sided) markets also leads to a “seesaw effect” in platform pricing, that is, some shock that raises the price of one side usually lowers the price of the other side. This effect is reflected to varying degrees in different industries, such as media, telecommunications and payments.

Second, “procedural justice” and the contestability of digital platforms

Another entry point to evaluate the pricing rationality of the platform is to start from the process of price formation and look at the degree of competition in the platform economy: if the market competition is sufficient, then the pricing formed in this way is relatively reasonable. If platforms have the power to monopolize pricing, then that pricing is generally considered to be detrimental to social welfare. Whether a platform has a monopoly is likely to depend not only on the number of large players (one or two or three) in the segment in which the platform is currently located, but also on the overall competitive pressure (such as the presence of cross-border competitors and disruptive innovators). Even if a market temporarily presents a monopoly or oligopoly market structure, but because of the existence of potential competitors, its pricing may be reasonable. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

American economist Richard Baumol and his collaborators put forward the “contestable” theory. An important feature of contestable markets is that entry and exit are completely free and cost-free. Pressure from potential (and probably unanticipated) competitors will constrain the pricing behavior of established players in the market. Therefore, even if the market structure of monopoly or oligarchy appears temporarily in this market, its pricing still follows the socially optimal marginal cost pricing rule.

In today’s digital age, this condition is not so distant. In the Internet era where the asset-light model prevails, user data is the most important resource, and the input related to data collection, storage, invocation, analysis and application can be universally converted and used in all walks of life. For example, platform companies that take user search as the entry point can easily enter other consumer markets such as e-commerce takeout and local life. The popularity of smartphones and the extensive coverage of telecommunications infrastructure have made the entry and exit threshold of the Internet industry quite low. Especially among Internet giants, it has become very easy to enter each other’s market territory. The universality of cross-border competition will make the leading platform enterprises face greater competitive pressure, so that the market equilibrium will be closer to the optimal result of social welfare to a certain extent. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

The concept of contestable market is similar to the classic perfect competitive market analysis framework in economics. Although it is very rare in real life, it still has a reference value that cannot be ignored as a reference point for analysis. “Contestability” is of great significance to understanding market structure and anti-monopoly policy. Regulators and antitrust policy should focus on reducing market entry and exit costs, rather than the current number of firms. Public sector responsibility for infrastructure investment, or ensuring that industry infrastructure is open to all businesses, is an important condition for maintaining a competitive market.

Third, digital platform pricing should take into account the market mechanism and social impact

The issue of platform pricing in the digital age has its special complexity, which is reflected in the following points:

First, digital platforms are not only bilateral markets, but also multilateral markets, and there are often three or more market participants interacting in the platform. For example, e-commerce and take-out platforms are mainly connected to consumers and businesses, but with the emergence of the importance of logistics distribution, couriers and take-out workers have also become key players in the platform. Video streaming platforms such as short video are mainly connected to users (content consumers) and content creators such as bloggers, but advertisers are an important source of revenue for the platform. This is also true for search engine platforms. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

Therefore, the pricing issue of the platform has become more complex, in addition to the balance of supply and demand and covering costs, it also involves certain interest coordination issues, and even assumes some social governance functions. In particular, it is important to clarify the objective function that platform pricing needs to achieve, and whether there are other non-price means that can be used to achieve a particular goal. The respective roles of the state and the market also need to be clarified.

Second, although digital platforms generally have certain network effects, economies of scale and economies of scope, there is strong heterogeneity at the industry level, and there is a large difference between platforms. For example, food delivery platforms differ from e-commerce platforms in that part of the process is done offline, so their economies of scale, network externalities, and the characteristics of multilateral markets are between pure online platforms (such as e-commerce) and pure offline platforms (such as department stores). For O2O platforms such as takeout and instant consumption, on the one hand, the network effect on the demand side is relatively more localized, and the audience scope reached by advertising is narrower and more timeliness than that of e-commerce. On the other hand, the supply side relies on offline distribution, and cannot achieve the scale effect that can be achieved by pure online economy. The network car platform is even more so, the real-time dynamic characteristics are obvious, and it is also more subject to the supply of human and material resources below the line.

Therefore, the pricing model of the platform is often closely linked to its business characteristics, and the corresponding regulatory policies should be appropriately adjusted according to the characteristics of the platform. Different business types of platforms, pricing models will be different, need to in-depth study and judgment, can not be generalized. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

Third, with the rapid development of the digital economy, new platforms continue to emerge, and the advantages of old platforms may fade, we should use a dynamic perspective to look at the degree of competition in the platform economy. In the Internet era where the asset-light model prevails, user data is the most important resource, and the input related to data collection, storage, invocation, analysis and application can be universally converted and used in all walks of life. For example, platform companies that take user search as the entry point can easily enter other consumer markets such as e-commerce takeout and local life. The popularity of smartphones and the extensive coverage of telecommunications infrastructure have made the entry and exit threshold of the Internet industry quite low. Especially among Internet giants, it has become very easy to enter each other’s market territory.

The universality of cross-border competition will make the leading platform enterprises face greater competitive pressure, so that the market equilibrium will be closer to the optimal result of social welfare to a certain extent. Pricing is determined by competition. If the market competition is sufficient, then the platform can not exceed the market forces to set prices, so that the price is relatively reasonable. CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）

To sum up, platform pricing and regulatory policies should balance the relationship between market mechanism and social impact, and take into account “outcome justice” and “procedural justice”. Regulators should pay close attention to the dynamic characteristics of the platform competition pattern, and pay attention to the power of the market itself when strengthening supervision. On the one hand, appropriate restrictions can be taken to clearly unreasonable platform pricing, but the focus should be on improving pricing mechanisms and rules to encourage platforms to provide consumers and small and medium-sized merchants with more added value based on digital technology, rather than collecting rents brought by monopoly power. On the other hand, it is more necessary to create a more inclusive policy environment for market competition, such as enhancing the “contestability” of the industry by lowering the entry threshold, reducing the direct intervention of administrative on platform micro-management, focusing policy forces more on cracking down on unfair competition, and letting market forces play the basic role of price discovery and resource allocation. Create a good policy environment for the standardized and healthy development of platform economy. The combination of “proactive government” and “efficient market”, each performing its own duties, can more effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers, activate the innovation vitality of platforms and small and medium-sized merchants, and promote the sustainable and healthy development of China’s digital economy.

由CXO UNION-CXO联盟（cxounion.cn）转载而成，来源于中新经纬；编辑/翻译：CXO UNIONCXO联盟小U。

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